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A Dual-Process Model of Economic Rationality: The Symmetric Effect of Hot and Cold 
Evaluations on Economic Decision Making 
 
 
Abstract: Understanding the influence of a dual-processing system on economic rationality of 
consumers is critical in helping them maximize the utility of their decisions. In two studies we 
explore economic rationality of choices based on “hot” and “cold” evaluations, as well as the 
overall rationality across both types of evaluations. We find that rationality levels of “hot” and 
“cold” evaluations are high and comparable, but the overall rationality level across both types of 
evaluations is significantly lower. We conclude that the discrepancy between the “hot” and 
“cold” evaluations is responsible for significant loss of utility in consumers’ economic decisions, 
rather than a specific type of evaluation (“hot” versus “cold”) in itself. We discuss theoretical and 
practical implications of our findings.  
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Introduction 
 
Consumers often go grocery shopping to buy food to consume throughout the week. One of 
their basic goals is to choose products that maximize their utility given the available budget. 
However, very often individuals make suboptimal decisions, which can potentially result in a 
loss of utility (Kahneman 2003; Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Understanding what drives 
economic rationality of consumers’ decisions is essential in order to help them improve the 
quality of their decisions, and as a result prevent significant losses of utility and enhance welfare 
(Ratner et al. 2008). The aim of the present research is to obtain more insight in the economic 
rationality of consumers’ decisions. 
A lot of research has linked irrationality to behavior triggered by a dual-processing system 
(Dhar and Gorlin, 2012). According to the literature, human behavior is guided by two types of 
processes (Kahneman and Frederick 2002), often referred to as a hot system and a cool system. 
The hot system operates relatively automatically, quickly and effortlessly, whereas the cool 
system is more deliberate, slow and effortful. The aim of the present research is to explore 
economic rationality in consumers’ choice behavior based on the two different systems, using a 
direct measure of economic rationality. Relying on the theory of Revealed Preferences, we 
develop a task that allows us to investigate rationality of behaviors based on the hot system on 
the one hand and the cold system on the other hand, and also allows us to investigate the overall 
rationality across the two systems. We do this by capturing the loss of budget resulting from 
those choice behaviors.  
 
Dual System Theory and Rationality 
 
One of the important assumptions in behavioral science is that decision making is driven by 
two types of processes (Epstein 1994; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Kahneman and Frederick 
2002; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2004), often referred to as the hot and the cool system. The 
hot system is quick and heuristic-based, whereas the cool system is deliberate and rule-based. 
The main features of the hot system are its automatic operation and minimal demands on 
working memory. The hot system operates mostly through components of associative memory, 
meaning that different associations emerge spontaneously and influence behavior. The hot 
system tends to be rapid, unconscious and uncontrollable (Evans and Stanovich 2013). In 
contrast, the main features of the cool system are its active engagement of working memory and 
analytical thinking. Cool system processing happens willful, and is effortful most of the time. It 
tends to be slow, conscious and controllable (Evans and Stanovich 2013).  
In an experimental study, Shiv et al. (2005) showed that participants able to use their 
emotional (hot) system made less advantageous gambling decisions and thus gained less money 
than participants not able to use their emotional system (due to brain damage) and thus relying on 
their cool system only for making decisions. Consumer research also provided evidence on the 
lack of rationality in choices resulting from hot system activation. Pocheptsova et al. (2009) 
found that consumers relying on their hot system (due to resource depletion) engaged in 
behaviors that are typically viewed as not rational, such as an increase in reference-dependent 
choices and the attraction effect. Moreover, studies on resource depletion showed that depleted 
consumers using their hot system were willing to pay significantly higher amounts of money for 
products than consumers who were not previously depleted (e.g. Bruyneel et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, more recent studies showed that certain features of cool behavior, like 
that it is more deliberate and less affective, can potentially lead to decisions being considered as 
irrational. Relying on cognitive processing during a choice task has been found to lead to less 
preference consistency than relying on affective processing (Lee et al. 2009; Nordgren and 
Dijksterhuis 2009).  These studies argue that deliberation can hinder systematic processing in 
decisions as it operates as a form of distraction which pulls individuals’ attention away from the 
most relevant information. Similarly, studies on unconscious thought and decision making show 
that the more deliberative approach taken by the cool system can lead to less accurate decisions 
in some situations (Dijksterhuis 2004; Dijksterhuis et al. 2006).  
Adopting yet another perspective, some studies suggest that loss of utility does not result 
from activation of a specific (i.e., the hot or the cool) system, but rather from a potential  
discrepancy between decision frames and/or decision situations. For instance, Read and 
Loewenstein (1995) found that when people choose multiple goods simultaneously (for instance 
during grocery shopping), they choose more variety of products than when they choose these 
goods sequentially (i.e., known as the “diversification bias”). According to the authors, this 
discrepancy in desired variety can potentially lead to inconsistent choices and loss of utility over 
time. Investigating the diversification bias further, Read et al. (1999) concluded that what 
appears to be desirable locally might not be likeable when adopting a more global perspective.  
To summarize, findings on the influence of dual-processing on rationality are equivocal. 
There are studies implying that economic irrationality is driven by the hot system, but there are 
also studies hinting at the idea that the cool system triggers irrational behavior. Other studies 
adopt a more neutral position, and suggest that a discrepancy between decision situations (and 
decision frames or states) may trigger inconsistent decisions, and thus result in an overall loss of 
utility. However, none of the studies investigating irrationality in decisions has used a direct 
measure of economic rationality involving conditions with different price regimes and budget 
restrictions. We believe that an investigation that does this could be very helpful in shedding 
light on the drivers of economic (ir)rationality. Use the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences 
(GARP) and Afriat’s Index to examine rational choice behavior in terms of efficient budget use. 
This method also enables us to experimentally isolate and assess the rationalities in hot states and 
cool states independently (local rationalities), and assess the overall rationality across the two 
states (global rationality) and compare the local and global rationality. 
 
Revealed preferences and Afriat’s Index 
 
Varian (1982) formulated the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP), which 
makes use of indirect revealed preferences. A chosen bundle of goods xi is “indirectly revealed 
preferred” over  some other bundle xt, if and only if  there exists a sequence of bundles xj, xk ,… , 
xs such that xi is directly preferred over xj, xj is directly preferred over xk, … , and xs is directly 
preferred over xt. According to the GARP, if a bundle xi is indirectly revealed preferred to xt, 
then xt is not strictly directly revealed preferred to xi, that is, xi is not strictly within the budget 
set when xt is chosen. Varian proved that GARP is a sufficient and necessary condition for 
decision-makers’ choices to be consistent with the maximization of a concave, weakly 
monotonic, locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.  
Figure 1 exhibits a GARP violation. Suppose an individual wants to dedicate a budget of 
120$ between 2 products X and Y. When the prices are p1 (X=12, Y=8) the individual can buy 
all combinations below the budget line b1. Suppose the individual chooses to buy the 
combination A(X=8, Y=3). When the prices change to p2 (X=8,Y=12) all possible combinations 
that lie in the area below the budget line b2 can be bought. However, should the individual 
choose to buy the combination B(X=3, Y=8), this would violate the GARP: bundle A is revealed 
preferred to bundle B, and bundle B is strictly revealed preferred 
to bundle A. By choosing combination B the individual actually 
wastes money as, for the given prices p2, the revealed preferred 
bundle A was available at a lower cost (equal to 8*8+3*12=100$) 
than the chosen bundle B (in which case s/he pays 
3*8+8*12=120$). In our example the individual thus failed to 
maximize the utility of the given budget as s/he chose bundle A 
over B when B was cheaper, while s/he also chose bundle B over 
A when bundle A was cheaper. Below we will introduce Afriat’s 
Index as a measure for the efficiency of consumers’ choices, 
which captures exactly this idea of budget waste associated with 
behavior that violates GARP.  
The essence of Revealed Preference theory and GARP lies in the concept of indifference 
curves. Indifference curves show the different bundles of goods between which a decision maker 
is indifferent. In other words, indifference curves show the quantity of product X an individual is 
willing to sacrifice to get a certain quantity of product Y. A utility maximizing individual always 
wants to move to higher indifference curves as s/he gets better 
bundles of products, meaning that s/he can combine the same 
quantity of X with larger quantities of Y  and vice versa. An 
individual who (given the chance) fails to move to higher 
indifference curves is considered to be irrational.  In the case of 
the example, a rational choice that maximizes the utility of the 
available budget at prices p2, given the fact that the individual 
chose the combination A (X=8, Y=3) at prices p1, would be 
combinations placed on the dotted section of the budget line b2, 
for example the combination D (X=12, Y=2). Choosing these 
combinations would allow the individual to move to higher 
indifferences curves and end up with bundles containing larger 
quantities of products. Choosing combination B (X=3, Y = 8) however would not (see figure 2). 
Afriat (1973) has introduced an efficiency index which can be used to measure the severity 
of the GARP violations. This measure has been developed in the context of budget waste. As 
explained above, a violation of GARP can be interpreted as a waste of money. The index can 
take values between 0 and 1. A value of 1 means that there are no GARP violations (and no 
budget is wasted), while a value below 1 reveals that GARP is violated (with corresponding 
budget waste). Generally, lower index values indicate that a larger fraction of the budget is 
wasted. We use GARP and Afriat’s index to assess the local rationality of choice behaviors based 
on the hot and the cool system separately, and the global rationality across states.  
 
Study 1 
 
Participants were 66 undergraduate students from a large university (52% women, average 
age 21 years, SD=2.05). As a manipulation of hot and cool system activation we used temporal 
distance. Literature argues that the smaller the temporal distance to an outcome, the larger its 
potential reward value is (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’ Donoghue, 2002; Malkoc and 
Zauberman, 2006). This implies that a small temporal distance will activate the hot system which 
is sensitive to immediate rewards. Conversely, a larger temporal distance to an outcome reduces 
its potential reward value, and therefore a larger temporal distance is more likely to activate the 
cool system (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999).  
Respondents were instructed to complete the rationality task for two different consumption 
time frames, present and future. In the present time frame (small temporal distance) they were 
told that they would be entitled to one of the choices they made in the study, which would be 
picked randomly by the computer program right after the experiment. In the future time frame 
(large temporal distance) they were told that they would be entitled to one of their choices one 
year after the experiment. The order in which participants engaged in each of the tasks (present 
time frame first or future time frame first) was counterbalanced, and  did not have an effect.  
To be able to calculate Afriat’s Index we created a choice task to assess participants’ 
revealed preferences. Our task was similar to the one used in studies of Harbaugh et al. (2001) 
and Bruyneel et al. (2012). The task included 12 sequential choice problems, with each choice 
problem consisting of four products: two vice, relative tasty but not so healthy (chocolate bar and 
Dorito chips) products and two virtue, relative healthy but not so tasty (baby carrots and raisins), 
products. The prices of the products differed for every choice problem. Participants were asked 
to indicate the quantities they wanted from each product given the different price regimes and 
their budget (10 tokens). For every choice problem participants had to spend their entire budget 
and had the option to choose non-integer quantities.  
To check whether the manipulation was successful, we measured the relative virtue and 
vice consumption for both time frames. We expected choices in a present time frame to be more 
vicious in nature than choices in a future time frame. To assess economic rationality, for every 
respondent we calculated the Afriat’s Index for each different time frame (system) separately and 
also the aggregated Afriat’s Index across both time frames (systems 
 
Results and discussion 
 
A paired samples test (twelve choices, two conditions) indicated that respondents selected 
more grams of vice products in the present time frame (Mpresent=231.21, SD=89.44) than in the 
future time frame (Mfuture=212.21, SD=90.18; (t(65)=2.51, p=0.015)). On the contrary, 
respondents selected fewer grams of virtue products in the present time frame (Mpresent=94.21, 
SD=85.15) than in the future time frame (Mfuture=116.83, SD=86.72; (t(65)=2.87, p=0.006)). 
These results validate our manipulation of the two systems.  
A Wilcoxon signed rank test on the Afriat’s indices revealed that the degree of rationality 
was constant across the two time frames (Mpresent=0.944, SD=0.105, Mfuture=0.942, 
SD=0.108) as the difference between the indices was not significant (Z=-0.278, p=0.781).  The 
results indicate that respondents’ choices were equally (ir)rational in both decision frames. The 
means of the Afriat’s indices indicate that individuals wasted on average 5,5% of their budget 
due to suboptimal choices.  
We calculated overall rationality across the two states in a way that allowed us to directly 
compare it with the individual rationalities for the two states separately. To meaningfully 
compare the three indices we constructed an overall Afriat’s index with components that were 
identical to the ones of the individual indices. Specifically, we randomly picked six observations 
from each time frame dataset for each respondent to neutralize the fact that Afriat’s index is 
sensitive to the number of observations. We avoided picking the same price regime twice to 
secure that the price regime variation in the global rationality assessment was identical with that 
of the within-frame tests. This yielded a dataset consisting of 12 observations per individual that 
allowed us to calculate an overall, cross-frames Afriat’s index that was directly comparable to the 
local indices. We repeated the same procedure 200 times and calculated the average of the 
overall Afriat’s index for every respondent.  
Comparing the overall Afriat’s index with the individual indices, we observed that the 
overall rationality (Moverall=0.902, SD=0.129) was significantly lower than both individual 
rationalities (Z=-3.440, p=0.001 for the present time frame and Z=-3.635, p<0.001 for the future 
time frame). Specifically, the overall waste of budget due to irrational choices across frames was 
approximately 10%, whereas in the individual consumption frames it was significantly lower 
(5,5%). For more information about the frequencies of the indices.  
The findings of our first experiment suggest that the choices in hot and cool decision states are 
equally rational. However, the overall rationally across states was significantly lower. Thus, 
though choice behaviors relying on the different systems were equally rational on the local level, 
the conflicting preferences revealed by the two systems had a negative impact on  rationality on a 
more global level.  
 
Study 2 
 
Participants were 67 undergraduate students from a large university (48% women, average 
age 20 years, SD=2.01). They were invited to come to the lab to complete a task assessing 
economic rationality (see Study 1) in exchange for money or course credit. As a manipulation of 
hot and cool system activation we varied the visceral state hunger. Participants were asked to 
complete the same choice task as in Study 1 in two different states, hungry (hot) and satiated 
(cool). Similar to the design of Nordgren et al. (2007), in the hungry state participants were 
instructed to not eat for at least four hours prior to the study. In the satiated state, participants 
were instructed to eat a full meal within an hour prior to the study. The order of the tasks was 
counterbalanced and separated by one week.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
A paired samples test showed that respondents chose more grams of vice products when 
hungry (Mhungry=211,99, SD=72,81)  than when satiated (Msatiated=177,87, SD=82,20; 
(t(66)=3.90, p<0.001)), whereas they chose fewer grams of virtue products when hungry 
(Mhungry=119,87, SD=70,38) than when satiated (Msatiated=149,52, SD=79,20; (t(66)=3.49, 
p=0.001)). This again validates our manipulation of the hot/cool state.   
The difference in Afriat’s index between the two states (Mhungry=0.972, SD=0.081, 
Msatiated=0.966, SD=0.054) was again insignificant (Z=-0.826, p=0.409). After a similar 
processing of the data as in Study 1, we calculated overall rationality and compared it with the 
separate rationality indices. The overall rationality was significantly lower (Moverall=0.93, 
SD=0.077) than the rationality of the individual states (Z=-3.836, p<0.001 for the hungry state, 
Z=-3.169, p=0.002 for the satiated state). The use of budget inconsistent with GARP was 2.8% 
for the hungry state and 3.3% for the satiated state, whereas overall it was 7%. The purpose of 
study 2 was to replicate the results of study 1. The findings indicate, in line with study 1, that 
locally, rationality of choice behaviors relying on the different systems is high and not 
significantly different between systems. However, once more we noticed a significant decrease in 
rationality when calculated across behaviors resulting from both systems. These results confirm 
that a significant loss of utility is the result of conflicting behaviors triggered by the different 
systems.  
 
General Discussion 
 
We conducted two studies to assess rationality of choice behaviors relying on the hot and 
cool decision systems. Results of the two studies indicate that the choice behavior resulting from 
both systems is equally rational, despite the fact that the product preferences were different. We 
conclude that both systems are equally appropriate to make economic decisions. However, a 
further analysis revealed that the discrepancy between the choices under the influence of the two 
systems had a negative impact on the overall rationality of the choices. This drop in overall 
rationality shows that the discrepancy between the preferences revealed by the different decision 
systems is responsible for a significant loss of decision utility.  
Our findings provide an answer to the question as to which system leads to more 
economically rational choices. We show that when it comes to economic decisions, both systems 
can be equally rational. Our study is the first to include realistic economic conditions, such as 
budget constraints and price variance, which presumably contributes to the discrepancy between 
previous findings and ours. The symmetry in our findings suggests that the decision making rules 
followed by the two systems in economic contexts involving price regimes and budget 
constraints might not be all that different. This is consistent with recent proposals suggesting that 
deliberative and intuitive judgment, as based on the cool and the hot system respectively, can be 
based on common principles in certain environments (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011).  
We contribute to the literature on economic rationality by showing that loss of utility due to 
irrational choices is not a result of the decisions driven by one specific system directly, but of the 
conflicting choices driven by these two systems separately instead. Our findings suggest that, 
although the levels of rationality resulting from activation of the two systems is not different, the 
discrepancy between choices resulting from activation of both systems can lead to suboptimal 
choices and loss of utility from an overall perspective. Last, our findings show that dual-system 
processing prevents consumers from forming global judgments about trade-offs between various 
products, and as a result prevents them from reaching indifference levels that would allow them 
to make the most optimal decisions. This finding can be related to literature on affective 
forecasting errors and hot-cold (and vice versa) empathy gaps. We show how difficulty of  one 
system to appropriately “forecast” the preferences activated by the other system leads to a waste 
of budget.  
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